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4. The level of practical application of the theory to local research kkk
4.1. The model of translation as the basis for the analysis of oral and written
translation
Now, if we take proposition 3b of the fully developed model of translation
(3b) LPIoK -- Fo (XmL,SmH)GtnP -- LPCoK == LPIiK -- Fi (XnL,SnH)GtnP --LPCiK
we can proceed to analyse several aspects of both speech acts (actes de parole,
actos de habla) Do and Di (that is to say, we can analyse the whole translation
process, be it oral or written), as follows:
LPIoK -- Fo(XmL,SmH,)GtnP - LPCoK=========LPIiK - Fi(XnL,SnH)GtnP -- LPCiK
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | ||||||||| Relationship
 
Sm/Sn |||| |
| | | |
| | | |
| +------ Relationship
 
Xm/Xn ------+ |
| |
| |
| |
 ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯ Relationship
 
LPCi / LPIo ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
if (3c) LPCiK =(Gtn)= LPIoK
that is, if there is real communication.
The relationship
 
Xm/Xn compares two syntactical structures in two different
speech acts (actes de parole, actos de habla) which is easier if both languages
belong to the same language family, and, of course, on condition that the
equivalence postulate 3c applies. It can happen, however, — and it is very
revealing — that those structures Xm/Xn have nothing in common, as in the case
of DDL (déviations délibérées de la littéralité, García-Landa 1978). We find a
recent example of this kind of analysis in Shlesinger (1995) where she studies
shifts in grammatical cohesion in Xm and Xn (which the author calls "texts", a
term which might create unnecessary confusion in the reader used to associate
the word "text" with printed paper although we understand that Shlesinger is
influenced by Toury's concept of "textual relations" in his first book34). This
                                                
34 See Hermans (1995: 219):
To the extent, however, that the notion [of Adequate Translation] implied a
(theoretical) total reproduction, in the translated text, of the textual relations present
in the source, it should presumably be visualized as coinciding with the original in
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study shows that it is very difficult to concentrate on this kind of relationship
without simultaneously taking into account the other two essential relationships
of the translation model, namely, Sm/Sn and, above all, LPCi / LPIo. And, of
course, we hav e to ins ist that none of these relationships  are int erest ing unless
condition (3c) applies. This means that they should be placed in the totality of the
translation model. If furthermore we accept the Magna Carta of the Interpreter's
Freedom, a very interesting research object would be to show cases where the
logical identity LPCoK ” LPIoK obtains in spite of a difference between linguistic
structures or even semantic structures (which is what we call DDL, deliberate
deviations from literality) because conference interpretation is not literal text
translation: The simultaneous interpreter can sometimes wait for the Speaker to
develop one or two or even three ideas to get the gist of what he is trying to say
and then proceed to sum all up in an intelligent way using totally different
"linguistic" structures. This also applies, of course, to the next relationship.
The relationship
 
Sm/Sn compares the semantic potential of the sign chain
Fo as used by the speaker/author to the semantic potential of the sign chain Fi
used by the interpreter/translator. An English interpreter can use the semantic
potential of "it's a tall order" to reproduce the intended meaning (Linguistic
Percept as Intended) by the French speaker/author in Gtn with "Nous devons
parcourir un long chemin". The "long chemin" and "tall order" are different
semantic potentials. The 3c equivalence obtains even if the semantic potentials
are different.
The relationship LPCi / LPIo compares what the subject of production
(speaker/author) wants to say with what the addressees of the interpreter/trans-
lator have understood and we will show later that there are ways of doing that.
Since we do not have direct access to the perceptions, we have to watch them as
they appear in Fo and Fi. We need to postulate that both Fo and Fi, with their
respective Xm/Xn and Sm/Sn, acquire a "meaningful" status once the
comprehension of the intended LP has created the "meaning meant" as a social
product. This particular condition can be seen clearly if we write:
(4) LPIo – Fo (GtnP) Fi -- LPCi
                                                                                                                
all but language. If one thinks for a second of literary texts, it becomes immediately
clear why this view is untenable: textual relations do not exist independently of the
language of the text... But the separation of textual relations from linguistic means
betrays a mechanistic conception, as if secondary modeling systems are simply
superimposed on the primary system, language.
It is obvious that Toury and Hermans are speaking of written texts and one
wonders whether the word "text" is really useful when one speaks of the oral talk
act in which, as Derrida says, the sign does not yet exist.
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We have to imagine what the linguistic percept was on both sides of the
"equation" (GtnP) by comparing the sense filled forms Fo and Fi in situation Gtn
accepting for the moment that that situation is exactly the same in both speech
acts (actes de parole, actos de habla) Do and DI (which is more plausible in SI
than in written translation).
For those readers who do not believe that the "meaning meant" (le sens) can
be materialised as an object (in spite of the fact that in logic it is "materialised"
without any trouble as conceptual content), it is important to affirm that it is
perfectly possible to say that (4) is the formal proof that the entity in question
can be made plausible. You can express that idea in everyday language by
saying that if two sense-filled sign chains Fo and Fi correspond to the same
meaning (if (3c) LPCiK =(Gtn)= LPIoK), then "le sens" exists formally as
defined by Gile (1995: 50) "not as a statement produced, i.e. the verbal
materialisation of a communication intention, but as the information that the
Sender wants to get across to the Receiver" (emphasis in the original).
4.2. The trajectory of meaning
What we are trying to say is that the essential aspect of the complicated and
multifaceted process of linguistic communication in the speech acts (actes de
parole, actos de habla) (oral or written) is the production of linguistic perceptual
spaces (S). Therefore, the essential aspect of the translation process is the
production of Linguistic Perceptions as the secondobjectal re-production (a new
production) of a previous LP (but let us not forget that it is perfectly possible to
claim a logical identity of the kind LPCiK ” LPIoK). With this perspective in
mind and our models (First and Second Theorems of our GTT), we can observe
what happens in the 'black box' of translation processes in a very real and
empirical way.
In this way we can visualise that esoteric, idealistic and perfectly Teutonic
idea of Walter Benjamin that the interesting thing in translation is the trajectory
of meaning in a continuum of metamorphosis (Kontinuum von
Verwandlungen)35. In (3b) we have "materialised", so to speak, that trajectory.
We see there an original linguistic percept (Linguistic Percept as Intended,
                                                
35 Nouss (1995: 337) recreates in French this idea of Benjamin:
La traduction est le transfert d'une langue dans une autre à travers un continuum de
métamorphoses, non pas des zones abstraites d'équivalence et de resemblance.
Here again we find the distinction between natural sciences, which study natural
processes, and social sciences, which study social interactions where there are no
"things", no "objects" but just relations of intentionalities and interpretations of
those intentionalities.
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LPIo) which goes through the production of a sign chain Fo in a social situation
Gnt, and we can observe how that intended linguistic perception jumps over the
abyss which separates two persons as it is reconstructed by this second person as
a Linguistic Percept as Comprehended (LPCoK) and how this second person,
called "interpreter" (o translator), produces a second sign chain Fi in the same or
in a different situation to provoke in others a linguistic perception (LPCiK) which
we have to postulate is secondobjectally equivalent to the initial and original
LPIoK.
This will allow us to program a research series focusing on that trajectory
which should be the main object of Translation Science. We need the following
experimental setting:
1) we have to record a real speech by a speaker at a real international
conference, a speech in the language "o" in a speech act Do, and we will take
the liberty of calling Do the sign chain as recorded,
2) let us have a group of interpreters ready to interpret this Do producing their
own discourse, and let us call Di this discourse produced by those
interpreters,
3) it being understood that the interpreters will listen to the recording of the Do
in a laboratory situation (hoping that some day we will be able to do this in
the real life situation), and that
4) both the recorded and played Do and the spontaneous Di of each interpreters
are recorded by an oscillographer.
The oscillograph produced by this operation will have this aspect:
Up we have the Do and down we see the Di
We see here two graphs, the Do on top and the Di below. Both consists of a
series of bubbles, which correspond to the blurts of sound coming from both
A Theoretical Framework for Oral and Written Translation Research 29
speakers' mouths. You can record both blurts chains either in seconds, or still
better for observation's purposes, in milliseconds. The first analysis is to number
those blurts. Let us call them blocks. This is a physical operation which takes
little time and one does not need to know to what sign chains they correspond.
The second operation consists of graphically defining and then numbering all Do
and Di blocks and writing over them the conventional written sign chains to
which they correspond. This is an operation which takes considerable time. At
this level you already find the first surprising findings which are well known in
analysis of spoken speech (segmentation), namely, the acoustic blurts do not
correspond to any grammatical units, they are just acoustic units. Second
finding: The Di blocks do not correspond exactly to the Do blocks, neither in the
time sequence, which might appear obvious, nor in their structure. Third finding:
A speaker can sometimes say a whole sentence or part of a sentence in less than
a second and some other times a pause or an "eh" might take 2 or 3 or even more
seconds. This means that the reality of time while speaking (and interpreting, is
another way of speaking) is very different from what is thought by people
accustomed to think of language as a set of written signs.36
4.3. Analysis of the relationships Di/Do
After you have done that, those Do and Di blocks are transcribed into the
corresponding seconds of the Analysis sheet. In the following example, I am
using real data taken from an actual research project.37 I transcribe part of an
oscillograph between seconds 571 and 623 with the Do, which was the same for
all 11 interpreters, and part of the Di of one of the interpreters. I present this, not
as a result but as an example of this method.
SECS Block
Do in
Ograph
Do Comments
describing the
relationship
between Do and Di
Block
Di in
Ograph
Di
571
571,5 Do 162 In a guilt culture
572
                                                
36 For example, the Argentinian writer Borges writes that the English language tends to
be shorter than Spanish because for example all English adverbs ending in "-ly" are
shorter than the corresponding Spanish adverbs that have to end in "-mente", which
is obviously a visual observation of a page and does not apply to oral speech (Do)
where you can say a Spanish "mente" adverb in less time than the corresponding
English "ly" adverb.
37 See Annex IV for more details about that research project.
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572,5 Grave loss of
573 the need for LPI in blocks Do
574 Do 163 supernatural 165
575 assurance
575,5
576 for an Dans les
576,5 authority cultures
577 Do 164 transcending Di 129 qui
577,5 man's suivaient la
578 insecurity nécessite d'une
579
580 man's anss d'une
581 ant Di 130 Personne
582 Do 165 sorry Surnaturelle
583 an-
583,5 xiety
584
585 appears to be Di 131 quip'
586 overwhelming as if Total LPI loss in
587 Do 166 the endorphines block Do 166 Qui
588 extend Di 132 permettait de
589 their action
590 to history comprendre et
591 Di 133 l'anxiété
592 It's very odd by the humaine
593 that Dodd should Partial LPI loss
594 Do 167 have been able but acceptable
595 to go
595,5 so deep
596
596,5 into
597 the Greek mind
598 Do 168 which is in fact loss of this il est très
599 the étonnant
600 Greek history Di 134 de voir comment on
601 à fond
602 But Good LPI le
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603 Greece, says reproduction, Di 135 l'esprit grec
604 Do 169 E R Dodd, has the name of US
605 a Bible nor
606 a church mais les
607 grecs n'ont ni une
607,5 and Di 136 bible ni
608 Do 170 that's why Apollo une
608,5 Total LPI loss église
609 Do 171 vicar on earth of the in Do 170-173
609,5 heavenly father
610
610,5 came
611 Do 172 to fill the gap
612
613 I
614 have just quoted
615 Do 173 a famous passage Comprehension
615,5 of that book Block Do 172 and
616
616,5 of
617 Do 174 course, the book
618 mention the
619 Bien entendu
619,5 t h o s e le livre
620 morphine like Di 137 ne mentionne pas
621 Do 175 e n d o g e n o u s l y la fin de
622 s e c r e t e d l'histoire
622,5 b y
623 the brain
To show what can be done with this methodology, I shall add a possible post
mortem evaluation of the case.
POST MORTEM. We have here a case of pathology of comprehension. The
interpreter, who was a student at a Brussels interpretation school, reveals in his
Di a lack of understanding of the subject (a faulty K, see Definition 8) which
might be due to lack of preparation. We can say that practically none of the LPIs
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of Do blocks under scrutiny has been totally reproduced, and some have been
entirely lost. This means that the equivalence (3c) is not satisfied, or not entirely
satisfied, and that, therefore, we cannot speak of translation. The interpreter does
not know the name of the US historian E. R. Dodd and, therefore, he was unable
to parse the acoustic input. This would be understandable if the interpreter had
no time to prepare. This applies also to the chemical substance called
"endorphins" and subsequent "morphines" that should have been heard but
obviously the interpreter was by now too nervous (the complete analysis sheet
shows from the very beginning this beginner's insecurity). This kind of failure
creates a psychological state of insecurity which in turn reduces the interpreter's
concentration capacity. This pathology should be given a name and a
description, for example, psychological destabilisation, defined as processing
capacity reduction caused by psychological insecurity caused in turn by LPI
losses due to faulty K. Unfortunately, the stretch I present here is a case of a
failure of translation, whereas other oscillographs offer more illuminating
avenues (see Annex IV) of the cognitive strategies of interpreters forced to
reproduce a flow of Linguistic Perceptions in a rapid fire of speech acts (actes
de parole, actos de habla).
Annex I Definitions
DEF.1: LPI LINGUISTIC PERCEPT AS INTENDED BY THE SPEAKER.
What the speaker intends to say which s/he perceives in her/his inner
speech. This is a "perception" and not a mere mental representation, not
just a mere image, and that perception is the result of the speech act (the
inner speech act, which is sometimes called "thinking").
DEF.2: LPC LINGUISTIC PERCEPT AS COMPREHENDED BY THE
INTERPRETER as representative of any hearer. What the hearer
understands. This is also a "perception", i.e., it corresponds to
something in the outside world, namely the speakers' intentionality
including the object of same. I can dream images but I cannot dream
perceptions. The linguistic perception is also called "comprehension",
and it is easier to understand as the result of the cognitive
comprehension process of the hearer (interpreter) but it also applies to
the speaker who perceives what s/he wants to say as a comprehension
result of her/his inner speech or inner speech act.
DEF.3: Xm SURFACE STRUCTURE OF THE SIGN CHAIN USED IN THE
SPEECH ACT. Surface structure is a Chomskyan term, referring, as
here, to the syntactical and lexical structure of the sign chain. A sign
chain has a given structure Xm, or Xn, Xp, etc.
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DEF 4: Sm SEMANTIC POTENTIAL OF THE SIGN CHAIN USED IN THE
SPEECH ACT. This is a new concept which refers to the meaning of
words and sentences in the dictionary as different from the meaning
meant and understood by speakers in real life situations (speech acts
(actes de parole, actos de habla)), i.e., the Linguistic Percepts defined
in Definitions 1 and 2. The semantic potential is defined in GTT as a
cluster of possible significations around a semantic nucleus. It can be
Sm or Sn, Sp, etc.
DEF.5: Fo LINGUISTIC UNIT USED IN THE SPEECH ACT Do. The actual
sign chain used in a real situation, that is, in a speech act. We write Fo
for an actual sign chain used in the speech act Do. We specify the
structure of the Fo by writing Fo(Xm,Sm) which refers to a certain sign
chain Fo with a certain surface structure Xm and a certain semantic
potential Sm. The GTT sees the Fo as the sign chain actually used in a
real speech act, and, therefore, it is no longer a mere linguistic sign
chain but a linguistic space permeated by the Linguistic Perception
produced by the cognitive process of comprehension. If you want to
invent a sign chain to make a point of grammar, this is not an Fo, just a
linguistic sign chain. The GTT postulates that it is possible to make a
difference at the analytical level, if not in reality, between the "aspect"
(or "moment") where the Linguistic Percept as Comprehended
(  Space) is produced and the "aspect" (or "moment") of the
Fo(Xm,Sm) (F Space). Once you have comprehended, your perception
impregnates your F Space, that is, the Fo(Xm,Sm). You can
analytically separate both Spaces,  and F , but in reality they are
always fused together in the totality of the speech act.
DEF.6: L SIGN SYSTEM. What people call sometimes "Language" in English
and "la langue" in Saussure's French. It is written as an exponent
affecting Xm (XmL) because it is a virtual or potential system -- not a
fact or an activity-- of which XM is an actualisation.
DEF.7: H SEMANTIC SYSTEM. The semantic system of a given language. It
is written as an exponent affecting Sm (SmH) because it is a virtual or
potential system, not a fact or an action.
DEF.8: K KNOWLEDGE BASE (including systems of thought and "discursive
formations"). The knowledge that the interpreter is supposed to share
with the speaker and her/his clients. It is written as an exponent
affecting Linguistic Perceptions because it is a virtual or potential
system, not an actual fact or an activity or action.
DEF.9: P BELIEFS, NORMS, PRACTICES. It includes all norms or rules
which more or less subconsciously influence or govern the behaviour of
social actors in speech acts (actes de parole, actos de habla) (see
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Annex II), and whose more or less conscious knowledge is necessary to
understand speakers (for example, rhetorical models to organise
sentences and speeches, modus dicendi, types and registers) and also
includes beliefs necessary to understand meanings meant by speakers
(Searle 83). It, therefore, includes cultural aspects (cultural otherness)
and social practices, lifestyles, etc. It is written as the exponent P
affecting the situation Gtn (GtnP) because it is a virtual system, not a
fact or an action.
DEF.10: Gtn SOCIAL SITUATION (SOCIAL CONTEXT OF THE SPEECH
ACT).38 The social situation includes a time tn and a space (a room) but
also the social relationships uniting or separating speakers and
everything that has been going on. It is like a scene of an act in a drama.
Annex II
The Language Production Room
Imitating Plato's myths and Searle's Chinese Room39, let us enter into this
particular planet, Adonais. In this planet, if you want to say something, that is, if
                                                
38 GTT, as published in García-Landa (1990), is a very shortened version of the
whole theory (as yet unpublished). The long version contains more definitions,
among them one for psychological factors which might affect the
production/comprehension of Linguistic Perceptions and another for prosody and
stress phenomena.
39 Searle (1980 and 1984), in his virulent attacks against Artificial Intelligence, tries
to prove that a computer program is not able, at present, to understand semantically
(that is, have perceptions), it can only proceed in a syntactical way. To make his
point visible, Searle imagines the myth of the Chinese Room: A man is in a small
room with two small windows; through one of them, he gets Chinese symbols and
he has a look-up list, which functions as a dictionary of strict equivalence, which
allows him to choose one English symbol equivalent to the Chinese symbol
coming in through the small window; once he has chosen that English symbol he
puts it through the other window. In this way, this man works like a computer, he
does not understand Chinese, he has no idea (no perception) of what the symbols
mean, but he can proceed syntactically. This also works as a model of
transliteration. A critic of the Chinese Room, Harnad (1989), puts it in the
following way: "Searle formulates the problem as follows: Is the mind a computer
program? Or, more specifically, if a computer program can simulate ... activities o f
ours that seem to require understanding (such as communicating in language), can
the program itself be said to understand in so doing? Searle's argument is based on a
very simple "simulation" of his own: First, suppose there is a computer program
that can simulate the understanding of Chinese by examining all the Chinese
A Theoretical Framework for Oral and Written Translation Research 35
you want to talk, you have to enter the Language Production Room. This Room
has a peculiarity, namely its floor and ceiling and four walls are built with a
substance which is composed of a mixture of three virtual systems, one is the
sign system used in Adonais, the second one is the Encyclopedia of Knowledge
and Discursive Formations of that planet, and the third is all the rules of social
behavior and social use of language which are in force in Adonais. And the
funny thing is that all those three systems produce a social electromagnetic field
which creates a series of orbits within the Room's space in such a way that when
you want to talk you can only use the sentences (sign chains) that are allowed in
that orbit network produced by that social electromagnetic field. Worse still, you
can only move in those predetermined orbits, you can only gesticulate in them,
even the facial expressions, ways of looking, smiles, hand movements, etc., are
only those defined by those orbits. This imposes on every speaker a set of
restrictions and constraints which we would consider intolerable in our
democratic planet but which the people living in Adonais consider perfectly
normal because they are born there and they have internalized those conditions
since the very first day of their existence. Children abandoned at birth and who
grow in the wild are later on incapable of entering that Room. (Because the
secret of that Room is that it does not only apply to Language but to every social
behavior in Adonais and in fact all social behavior is language behavior). All
those constraints turn out to be very useful in the end because they allow
comprehension and real communication between speakers and social actors
generally. It is because everybody has to live in that network of orbits created by
the social electromagnetic field of the three virtual systems –and they are called
"virtual" because nobody sees them nor the network, they just act in it because
                                                                                                                
symbols it receives as input and consulting an internal look-up table that indicates
what symbols it should send back as output. If such a program could perform (one
might say dissimulate) very well -- well enough, let's suppose, to convince a
Chinese speaker at a teletype terminal that he was telecommunicating with another
Chinese speaker rather than with a machine -- it would have passed "Turing's Test"
(Turing 1964). According to that test, we should stop denying that a machine i s
"really" doing the same thing a person is doing if we can no longer tell their
performances apart. That is, if a person does understand Chinese, and the
machine performs so well that we can't tell whether or not it's a person, then the
machine must understand Chinese too. Now Searle "simulates" the simulation:
Suppose that, instead of a computer program, Searle himself (who understands no
Chinese) receives the Chinese symbols, does the look-ups in the table, and sends
back the requisite output symbols. Since Searle obviously would not be
understanding Chinese under those circumstances, neither could the computer
simulation he was "simulating" have been. And neither, by extrapolation, could
any computer simulation of anything. So much for the Turing Test, and the mind as
a computer program."
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there is no other way of acting-- that everybody "understands" what others are
trying to say and do, what they mean with their smiles and their words. This is
the very condition of understanding. People on Adonais, adionysiacs as they are
called, understand each other, not because they understand the mind of others
but because they share a common orbit network created by a powerful social
field produced by three virtual systems. The meaning is not in the mind, it is not
a psychological event but an open social fact. It is as if all adionysiacs did was to
produce a set of hieroglyphs easily read by others in the Social Production
Room. Let's face it, for that is what it is.
Annex III
The "Innocent" Description of the activity of SI40
Sitting next to his or her boothmate, an interpreter who works in
simultaneous mode has but little time to reconstitute what the speaker is saying
in another language. All simultaneous interpreters would confirm that what they
are repeating is not the speaker's words, like mere parrots might do, but what the
speaker is actually saying, the ideas. In order to do so, simultaneous interpreters
obviously need to understand what the speaker is saying, and to do that, the
prerequisite is fully understanding the speaker's language, as it is commonly
spoken. It is not enough for the interpreter to be acquainted with the language in
its written form, as might be the case with a philologist. Real life knowledge of
the spoken language is required, and that is why the best interpreters are those
who have spent several years in the country of the speaker's language. It is
furthermore necessary for the interpreter to have some knowledge of the field or
the subject the speaker is referring to.
The most significant factor, however, is that simultaneous interpreters work
under strong time pressure. They have but a few seconds before they must repeat
in their own language the ideas the speaker has just put across in his. It
frequently happens that the speaker puts an idea across in some 300 milliseconds
and that the interpreter has about the same amount of time to convey that idea
before the next one comes along at the same speed. Sometimes while the
interpreter is still uttering the previous idea, s/he is already memorising the next
one spoken by the speaker. In any event, the interpreter needs to concentrate
totally and intensely on what the speaker is saying, while at the same time the
interpreter produces his/her own speech in his working language, reproducing
the ideas s/he has understood or believes to have understood.
                                                
40 This is a text written by a profesional interpreter who has not wasted his time
reading theories of interpretation or of translation. He is, therefore, innocent of
any theory.
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Due to this intense state of concentration, interpreters are unable to work for
more than an hour without resting at least a few minutes. In Europe, interpreters
working in simultaneous mode work and rest in half-hour shifts. This time
pressure we mentioned is not constant in quality. Sometimes the speaker
hesitates, pauses (or repeats himself) and this gives the interpreter a small break
during which s/he can have a thought of her/his own or exchange a couple of
sentences with her/his boothmate. Sometimes s/he is even able to think about
what s/he just said into the microphone and criticise the way s/he said it.
Because there are always at least two interpreters in the booth, the one who is
not working has a chance to observe the process of interpretation in her/his
colleague, observing how the speaker's words and ideas are being rendered by
their colleague. This process is somehow foreseeable because quite often the
colleague who is not working can quickly write a word which s/he knows is
going to be needed in the next milliseconds by the colleague working.
There are actually several different situations: A speaker in a small
negotiating committee speaks differently from someone making a solemn
speech. In general terms many interpreters would agree in saying that it is more
difficult to interpret someone who is reading a speech than someone speaking
extemporaneously. They would say that someone reading a speech is not
"thinking" whereas someone improvising a speech has to "think" about what s/he
is saying and how to put it into words... which is what everybody does when we
speak.
Annex IV
This was a research project I organized in 1981 at the Audiology Department
of Louvain-la-Neuve University with Professor Schneppe in which 11
interpreters (7 professionals and 4 students) were subjected to a prepared speech
on European history (with some parts of a real Do) which contained a series of
experimental traps. Some of these experimental traps were, for example: in the
context of the French Revolution, the Do said deliberately "French Evolution"
and all the interpreters, except one, translated by French 'Revolution', which
would tend to prove that we construct what we hear according to what we
expect. Another trap is that all of a sudden the Do contained lists of isolated
words totally out of context and most of the 11 interpreters had less difficulty in
reproducing them than expected. Both Do and Di were recorded in a liquid-jet
oscillograph but, on top of that, we wired the interpreters for several neuro-
phyisiological reactions, like brain irrigation of both hemispheres, two cardiac
reactions, lie detector reaction in a hand palm, (which reveals the interpreter's
"external" excitement level), respiratory curves and eye movement curves. The
project's final objective was to see whether there were any detectable physical
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reactions at the moments when the supposed comprehension reaction would take
place, and this detectability was the very first object of the exercise. The project
was interrupted for lack of funds but all 11 recordings were made and I still have
them, together with the first analysis which revealed many interesting things
about what happens in the black box of SI. I was, and still am, convinced that
this method is extremely interesting. One of the provisional results, for example,
is the discovery that there are two types of excitement or nervousness: the
external agitation of the students as revealed by the detector-lie curve, and the
deep brain activity of the professionals, who were calm at the detector-lie level
but whose brain irrigation curves (there were actually derivatives of the first
curve) showed a lot of cerebral activity. Students showed less activity at this
brain level. And of course the principal provisional result is the one which
should appear in the column of comments on the relation Di-Do: Here you can
see the main activity of the black box, i.e., you see what decisions the interpreter
is taking in the very short time at his/her disposal. We "see" sometimes the
strategies of the interpreter, how and why s/he decides to put on hold a certain
Linguistic Percept as Intended (LPIo) which s/he has transformed into an LPCi
waiting for an opportunity some seconds later to place it in a different Di block.
We "see" how subconsciously, with the innocent spontaneity of a speaker
(without knowing any theory about what s/he is doing) the interpreter takes
advantage of the peculiarity of human language which allows the expressing of
the same LP (Linguistic Percept) in several ways,41 sometimes with longwinded
sign chains (Fo and Fi), other times with very short ones, a circumstance that the
GTT clearly expresses by defining it as the relationship between Fo and L
(LPIo) =(Gtn) = (LPCo), id est:
Fo / PLCo = (Gtn) = PLCo
                                                
41 That is Sartre's vision of language, the principle of repeatability:
Et pareillement la signification d'une mélodie -si on peut encore parler de
signification- n'est rien en dehors de la mélodie même, à la différence des idées
qu'on peut rendre adéquatement de plusieurs manières. (Sartre 1948)
Ricoeur (1976: 16) "repeats" this idea in this way: "Because the sense of a sentence
is, so to speak, 'external' to the sentence, it can be transferred; this exteriority of
discourse to itself - which is synonymous with the self-transcendence of the event
to its meaning -     opens   discourse to the other. The message has the ground of its
communicability in the structure of its meaning". Gile (1995: 52) puts it this way:
If different sentences can correspond to the same Message, and if this is applicable
in both the source language and the target language, then in translation, different
sentences in the target language may reflect the same Message as the one initially
generated in the source language (emphasis in the original).
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We "see" why those decisions are taken, we "see" the problem that the
interpreter has to solve and how s/he solves it. We "see" why the interpreter
sometimes fails and in what way. I imagine that this kind of analysis could be
presented in slide form at international conferences on translation science. Also,
this method would be adequate for judging interpretation students performance
at exams. By the way, in this provisional examination there were no discernible
traces of any correlation between neuro-phyisiological reaction and
comprehension (percept production).
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